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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Arthur Pena was a veteran police officer of the West New 
York, New Jersey, Police Department ("WNYPD"), who, along 
with other officers, accepted bribes in return for permitting 
illegal poker video gambling machines to operate without 
interference in certain areas of New Jersey. At issue on 
appeal is the proper application of S 2C1.1 of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of this case, and, 
specifically, the propriety of the District Court's 13-level 
increase in Pena's offense level based on the benefit 
received by the payor of the bribes from Pena's illegal 
conduct between 1989 and 1992. He contends that, 
because the government failed to prove the "net benefit" to 
the gambling machine distributors who paid the bribes at 
issue, he should have been sentenced based on the 
aggregate amount of the bribes. As a part of this argument, 
he urges that the "net benefit" calculation requires a 
showing of the net profit to the distributor. The District 
Court correctly rejected his arguments based on our prior 
decision in United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44 (3d Cir. 
1993). We will affirm. 
 
Pena was convicted by a jury in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey of conspiracy to commit 
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1951(a) for "protection" 
payments made between 1989 and 1996 by one of the 
distributors of the machines at issue, GMOG.1 GMOG was 
owned by George Riveiro, who operated it with the help of 
his brother Luis. GMOG placed the machines in 
establishments such as bars and restaurants, maintained 
the machines, and split the profits with the establishments' 
owners. Patrons would deposit money into the machines for 
game credits on which they made wagers; at the end of the 
game, the credits would be exchanged for cash. GMOG 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The jury also found Pena guilty on two counts of an indictment 
charging him with subscribing false 1991 and 1992 tax returns in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7206(1). 
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collected the money from the machines weekly, figured out 
the credits, reimbursed the establishment for the money 
paid out to winners, and then split the profit with the 
establishment on a 50:50 basis. 
 
The evidence at trial revealed routine payments had been 
made by GMOG to Pena in the amount of $2,000 each 
month from 1989 through April 1993. At sentencing, the 
government introduced the affidavit of FBI Special Agent 
Kenneth O'Connor recounting interviews he had with Luis 
Riveiro on December 3 and 7, 1999, regarding the m onies 
derived from the operations. The affidavit contained the 
following evidentiary averments: 
 
        4. During the above-described conversation,[Luis] 
       Riveiro told me, in substance and in part, that 
       approximately two years ago he totaled the weekly 
       figures and determined how much GMOG collected on 
       a yearly basis from 1988 through 1995. Riveiro stated 
       that in 1988 they earned $323,000, in 1989 the 
       amount was $986,300, in 1990 the amount was 
       $1,021,700, in 1991 they earned $726,800, in 1992 
       they earned $452,110, in 1993 they earned $302,630, 
       in 1994 they earned about $158,290, and in 1994 they 
       earned about $41,380. He further told me that about 
       ten to fifteen percent of these figures were derived from 
       legal activity such as children's games and juke boxes 
       and that about ninety-five percent of these earnings 
       were from machines in West New York, New Jersey. 
 
        5. In December 1999 I spoke to George Riveiro, the 
       owner of GMOG. He told me in substance and in part, 
       that GMOG earned an average of $5,000-$6,000 in 
       profit per week during the most profitable years. 
       George Riveiro also told me that his brother Luis 
       Riveiro actually collected the revenues from the 
       locations where they placed machines and thus, would 
       be in a better position to provide a more accurate 
       recollection of GMOG's revenues. 
 
App. at 107. 
 
Pena argued at sentencing that the government had 
failed to prove the specific "net profit" or"net benefit" and 
that the court must sentence him based on the aggregate 
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bribe amount proven -- $96,000. The government argued 
that it had in fact proven the benefit received by GMOG, 
namely, the revenues GMOG realized from the illegal 
operation. 
 
The District Court considered the parties' arguments and 
adjourned the hearing in order to consider the issue in the 
context of a recent split in the rulings of the courts of 
appeals as to the meaning of "net benefit" under the 
sentencing guidelines. 
 
The District Court reconvened the sentencing hearing two 
months later and ruled that, consistent with our opinion in 
United States v. Schweitzer, "net benefit" in this situation 
was the monies realized from the illegal operation, quoting 
our statement in Schweitzer that "net benefit . . . has 
nothing to do with expense incurred by the wrongdoer in 
obtaining the net value received" where the transaction was 
wholly illegal. 5 F.3d at 47. 
 
The District Court then relied on the revenues shown to 
have been received by GMOG for the 50:50 split from illegal 
operations. Then, based on the information Luis Riveira 
provided O'Connor, the Court netted out 20% to account 
for business outside of West New York and the proceeds 
from the few legitimate machines, and therefore made a fact 
finding of $2,573,000 as "GMOG's net benefit received for 
the years 1989 through 1997." App. at 81-82. 
 
The District Court noted that the government had offered 
two different calculation methods, but both arrived at 
approximately the same number.2 Based on this finding, 
Pena's offense level was 25, and with a Criminal History 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court explained: 
 
       The amounts of winnings are about as precise as we can determine 
       them in hindsight. This figure is also supported by a completely 
       different method, namely, if we had taken the probation 
       department's estimates of 16,000 a month in `89 and 70,000 a 
       month in `90, `91 and `92, we get a figure of approximately 2.7 
       million dollars, those are figures that come from paragraph 146. So 
       the two sums are quite consistent by either method of calculation. 
 
App. at 82. 
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level of 1, the guideline range was 57 to 71 months. The 
District Court sentenced Pena to 57 months. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal of the 
Court's sentencing determination based on 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2). 
 
We begin our review by examining the guideline 
provisions at issue found at S 2C1.1, which states that the 
base offense level of 10 is to be increased in certain 
circumstances: 
 
       Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; 
       Extortion Under Color of Official Right 
 
       . . . . 
 
       (A) If the value of the payment, the benefit received 
       or to be received in return for the payment, or the 
       loss to the government from the offense, 
       whichever is greatest, exceeded $2,000, increase 
       by the corresponding number of levels from the 
       table in S 2F1.1 (Fraud and Deceit). 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) (2000) 
(emphasis added). 
 
It is conceded that, here, the value of the "benefit 
received in return for the payment" was greater than the 
value of the payment, or the loss to the government. 
Accordingly, we look to Application Note 2, which explains: 
 
       . . . The value of "the benefit received or to be received" 
       means the net value of such benefit. Examples : (1) A 
       government employee, in return for a $500 bribe, 
       reduces the price of a piece of surplus property offered 
       for sale by the government from $10,000 to $2,000; the 
       value of the benefit received is $8,000. (2) A $150,000 
       contract on which $20,000 profit was made was 
       awarded in return for a bribe; the value of the benefit 
       received is $20,000. Do not deduct the value of the 
       bribe itself in computing the value of the benefit 
       received or to be received. In the above examples, 
       therefore, the value of the benefit received would be the 
       same regardless of the value of the bribe. 
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines S 2C1.1, cmt. n. 2 (2000). 
 
The "Background" section of the Application Notes states, 
further: 
 
       Where the value of the bribe exceeds the value of the 
       benefit or the value of the benefit cannot be 
       determined, the value of the bribe is used because it is 
       likely that the payer of such a bribe expected 
       something in return that would be worth more than 
       the value of the bribe. Moreover, for deterrence 
       purposes, the punishment should be commensurate 
       with the gain to the payer or the recipient of the bribe, 
       whichever is higher. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines S 2C1.1, cmt. background 
(2000). 
 
While Pena criticizes the vague nature of the numbers 
contained in the O'Connor affidavit as a basis for 
calculating the dollar amounts for purposes of sentencing, 
he does not challenge its sufficiency or the court's factual 
finding as such.3 Rather, he attacks the District Court's 
ruling that the revenues, rather than the net profits, are the 
proper measure of "net value" of the benefit. He complains 
that the District Court has misinterpreted the guidelines. 
Accordingly, we will review the District Court's ruling under 
a de novo standard. United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 
189 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
Pena relies to a great extent on the decision of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Sapoznik, 161 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 1998), decided after our 
ruling in Schweitzer. Pena limits his discussion to the 
consideration of these two cases. We note that if we were to 
follow Sapoznik, Pena might in fact succeed, while, under 
Schweitzer, he clearly will not. 
 
Sapoznik also involved illegal gambling operations, and 
the court there held that the government had failed to prove 




3. Pena attacks the substance of O'Connor's affidavit based only on his 
view that specific net revenue needed to be shown and that, lacking such 
proof, the bribe amount should be used. Appellant's Brief at 18-20. 
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       The government concedes that the relevant "benefit 
       received" is indeed profit (net revenue) and not (gross) 
       revenue. U.S.S.G. S 2C1.1, Application Note 2; United 
       States v. Glick, 142 F.3d 520, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1998); 
       United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d 44, 47 (3d Cir. 
       1993); but cf. United States v. McAlpine , 32 F.3d 484, 
       489 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 
161 F.3d at 1119. Given this concession, the court 
examined the record and held that the case should be 
remanded for resentencing, because the record contained 
no proof by the government regarding the costs of the illegal 
enterprise. While we understand that the government's 
concession may have misdirected that court, we reject the 
notion that profit is relevant for a consideration of "net 
value" of "benefit." We also reject the thought that our 
decision in Schweitzer, or the Second Circuit's decision in 
Glick, stood for such a conclusion, as the Seventh Circuit's 
reference seems to indicate. Although in certain cases the 
profit may be equal to the net value, as illustrated by 
Application Note 2, and as we discuss in more detail below, 
the concept of netting out costs to arrive at profit is 
inappropriate under the Guidelines section when the 
transactions are entirely illegitimate. 
 
Pena argues that Sapoznik requires us to consider only 
GMOG's net profit by subtracting out costs related to the 
illegal activity, and he tries to find in Schweitzer some 
further support. In Schweitzer we first considered the 
meaning of "net value" of benefit. Schweitzer was a private 
investigator who bribed former and current employees of 
the Office of Inspector General for confidential information 
that he then supplied to others for a fee. After paying 
$4,680 for the information, he sold it for roughly two times 
that amount. We rejected Schweitzer's contention that the 
$4,680 should be deducted -- his cost for conducting the 
illegal activity -- noting that the cases he relied upon allow 
for the deduction of the value that would be derived in a 
legitimate transaction not induced by a bribe, whereas he 
was arguing not that value derived, but rather expenses 
incurred, should be deducted. We noted that the concept of 
value had nothing to do with costs incurred. In Schweitzer 
we did not specifically address the issue of net profit or the 
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deduction of costs of operation, because the "amount paid" 
appears to have been the bribe amount specifically not 
deductible under the guidelines. 
 
Nonetheless, we think that our focus in Schweitzer was 
entirely correct. Application Note 2 actually provides the 
proper focus. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, S 2C1.1, cmt. 
n.1 (2000). It speaks in terms of "net value" of benefit. Id. 
The examples it recites clearly demonstrate that, to arrive 
at the proper amount, we are to deduct the value 
legitimately and actually given, from the value received, to 
arrive at the "net value" of the benefit caused by the bribe. 
Id. Thus, if a $10,000 piece of property is sold for $2,000, 
the bribe caused an $8,000 benefit -- the purchaser 
received a $10,000 piece of property for only $2,000. 
Similarly, if a $20,000 profit is made on a $150,000 
contract, the contract provided $130,000 of services and/or 
product -- value given -- so the benefit caused by the bribe 
was $20,000. In both examples, there was, as we noted in 
Schweitzer, "a sale item" that "had a value that a purchaser 
in a legitimate transaction would receive," and"that value 
was not received as a result of the bribe and should not be 
considered in determining the degree of the bribe giver's 
culpability." We stated, in clear terms: "This concept of `net 
value received' has nothing to do with the expense incurred 
by the wrongdoer in obtaining the net value received. This 
is clear from the Note's instruction that the value of the 
bribe is not to be deducted in calculating the `net value.' " 
5 F.3d at 47. 
 
We were entirely correct in Schweitzer, and when we 
apply this reasoning to the case at hand it is apparent that 
the illegal gambling operations involved no legitimate object 
or service of value, and that every dollar received by GMOG 
was received because of the bribe -- not because of the 
intrinsic value of anything being provided. As a result, the 
entire amount of the revenue was the benefit. Unlike a 
situation where something of legitimate value was provided 
to an individual, or for the benefit of society, such as 
services or a physical item of value, the operations here 
were wholly illegal and therefore there was no other value to 
"net out." 
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Pena attempts to address this aspect of Schweitzer by 
arguing that the government should have netted out 
monies that the machines generated that may have been 
legitimate. But the District Court already took into account 
Riveiro's estimate of legitimate proceeds from legitimate 
machines or other locations, and Pena's counsel admitted 
that all revenues from the gambling machines were illegal. 
To require that other monies be deducted would convert the 
test into one in which the government must investigate 
whether any legitimate value had been given in an illegal 
operation. While the government does have the burden to 
establish the value, United States v. McDowell , 888 F.2d 
285, 291(3d Cir. 1989), we are not prepared to impose on 
the government the onerous task of proving that each 
separate expense transaction in an illegal operation had 
absolutely no legitimate value or benefit. Pena asks us to 
read too much into the concepts of "value" and"benefit." 
We believe it more appropriate to limit the exercise to an 
assessment of what is obvious in the fact pattern. In both 
of the examples in the guidelines it is quite apparent that 
something legitimate was in fact provided in the 
transaction, and the bribe-caused portion easily 
identifiable. Here, it is just as easily seen that nearly all the 
revenues were derived from the illegal operation of the 
machines and were directly attributable to, and derived on 
account of, the bribes in question. 
 
We also note that the notion of deducting costs 
associated with furthering purely illegal activity, as the 
reasoning of Sapoznik would call for, is simply illogical. 
First, it would be nearly impossible to establish because 
most criminals do not keep detailed records regarding the 
costs of maintaining their illegal business. Second, these 
expenses were tainted because they were incurred in 
furthering the criminal activity. 
 
Thus, we have held, and we reiterate, that "net value" of 
the "benefit" received does not mean "net proceeds." Rather, 
it means benefit received after netting out the value of what 
-- if anything -- of legitimate value, was provided. 
 
It is interesting to note that the case law reference to net 
profit, or netting out costs, may have arisen due to the fact 
that, in some instances, the two concepts -- deducting 
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value given and deducting direct costs -- may be somewhat 
the same. For instance, consider the case of the doctor who 
bribes an official and, as a result, obtains many referrals 
for the sale of lymphodema pumps, as in United States v. 
Leon, 2 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D.N.J. 1998). If the doctor has 
sold the pumps for $100, but they were worth $60-- which 
he did pay, and which value the purchaser did receive -- 
there are two ways of looking at the fact that the net benefit 
was $40. Perhaps a court might describe the underlying 
principle in terms of permitting the deduction of direct 
costs, i.e., a cost of goods sold. Based on our reading of the 
guidelines, however, we view this in terms of "netting out" 
the legitimate value given, i.e., the portion that was received 
not as a result of the bribe, but rather in return for the 
product's intrinsic value. There is simply no such value in 
this case. 
 
We note that, as we mentioned above, the District Court 
here took extra time to examine this issue and "got it right." 
The court drew on Schweitzer and its obvious implications 
in this case, correctly reasoning: 
 
       As applied to the present case, Schweitzer teaches that 
       where the object of the conspiracy, namely, the 
       protection of illegal gambling, is illegitimate, all 
       proceeds flowing to the conspirators -- here, GMOG-- 
       are to be regarded as the benefit received in return for 
       the extortion payment. The "net value" of the benefit 
       received by Pena's coconspirators at GMOG is the gross 
       revenues they derived from the protected illegal 
       gambling in West New York in the relevant time period. 
 
App. at 72. 
 
The District Court then noted that the proper analysis 
had been similarly conducted in United States v. Leon, 
summarizing the court's explanation in that case: 
 
       The Court's task is to determine the difference between 
       what did happen as a result of the bribe and what 
       would have happened if not [for] the bribe. The Court 
       would permit the deduction of legitimate costs that 
       would have been incurred in a legitimate transaction 
       regardless of a bribe payment, and the Court would not 
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       deduct illegitimate costs that would not have occurred 
       in the absence of a bribe payment. 
 
App. at 72 (paraphrasing Leon, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 597). 
 
The District Court concluded: 
 
       I hold that in calculating the "benefit received" from 
       payment of extortion to protect illegal gambling, the 
       proper figure equals the revenues received by the bribe 
       payors (here, the GMOG owners) derived from the 
       illegal gambling operations which were being protected, 
       unreduced by the amount of the bribes themselves or 
       by the other costs of maintaining the illegal gambling 
       business. 
 
App. at 75. 
 
Accordingly, the District Court committed no error in its 
reasoning and ruling, and we will affirm its judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
 
A True Copy: 
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